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The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external
opportunities
Abstract
We study a cooperative problem where agents contribute a certain amount of money
or capital in order to obtain a surplus. The proportional distribution with respect to the
contributions of players is a core element of the cooperative game associated. Within this
basic model, an external agent is introduced in order to evaluate the potential profit of
every subcoalition of agents in the case this new agent enters. This analysis can produce
that the relative bargaining power of agents may be modified. In particular, we evaluate
whether the proportional distribution is still a robust proposal from the point of view of the
bargaining set of a cooperative game with coalition structure (Davis and Maschler, 1963).
Since, in general, the proportional distribution fails to be a bargaining set element of this
game, a sufficient condition for the proportional allocation to belong to the bargaining
is stated. A necessary condition is also analysed. Finally, we state a sufficient condition
that guarantees the proportional distribution to be the unique element of the bargaining
set of the associated game with coalition structure.
Resum
En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperacio´ entre agents on cada agent
realitza una contribucio´ (diners, capital, treball, esforc¸) per tal d’obtenir un benefici comu´
a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions e´s una distribucio´ que
pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d’aquest model ba`sic s’introdueix un
agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportacio´ que serveix per avaluar el po-
tencial benefici de cada subcoalicio´ d’agents si aquest nou agent finalment entre´s. Aquesta
ana`lisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s’avalua si la
distribucio´ proporcional e´s encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinenc¸a al
conjunt de negociacio´. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model
de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalicio´. Donat que, en general, la distribucio´ pro-
porcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociacio´, s’estudia una condicio´ suficient per a que
aix´ı sigui. Tambe´ enunciem una condicio´ necessa`ria, i finalment es proposa una condicio´
suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional e´s la u´nica distribucio´ existent
dins del conjunt de negociacio´
Keywords: cooperative game, proportional distribution, bargaining set,
coalition structure
JEL Clasification: C71
1 Introduction
Many cooperative activities involve the contribution of money, capital or labour by the
agents engaged in these tasks. Some models and applications can be found in Izquierdo
and Rafels (2001), Lemaire (1991) or the one-input one-output model analysed by Mas-
Colell (1980). The proportional distribution with respect to agents’ initial contribution
arises as a natural allocation rule of the surplus generated. In this paper we approach this
situation from the point of view of cooperative games. We mainly focus on analysing the
effects in the proportional distribution when we allow the possibility to cooperate with
an external agent. The role of this external member is merely to revise the properties of
the proportional allocation considering these eventual external opportunities of agents.
To illustrate the above idea, let us consider the following example. Three partners
in a company are contributing an amount of money c1 = 100, c2 = 100 and c3 = 300,
respectively. Let us suppose that the average return expressed in percentage is given
by the following function r that depends on the amount invested x: r(x) = 20%, if
0 ≤ x < 500 and r(x) = 30%, if x ≥ 500. Notice the higher yield (30%) is only obtained
when the three investors jointly contribute, obtaining 500 × 30% = 150. This suggests
that the proportional distribution, p = (30, 30, 90), seems hard to be refuted, although
the third investor contributes three times of both investor 1 or 2.
Let us consider now an external partner (investor 0) endowed with a capital c0 = 200.
This external agent will give new insight into the proportional distribution. In particular,
investor 3 may argue that an eventual coalition with investor 0 allows him to obtain
the highest yield without the contribution of partners 1 and 2, while a similar argument
cannot be used by these partners. This fact indicates that the relative opportunity costs
of agents is altered and so the proportional distribution might be revised.
Firstly, in this paper we analyse a cooperative model where there are increasing returns
to scale with respect to some initial endowments. With this assumption, the proportional
distribution always lies in the core of the cooperative game associated. This model can
be embedded in the more general class of games, the average monotonic cooperative
games (Izquierdo and Rafels, 2001), for which the core and the bargaining set (Davis and
Maschler, 1967) do coincide. In Section 2 we introduce this basic model and we analyse
some structure of the core of the associated game. Basically, we provide a necessary and
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sufficient condition to identify when the core of the game shrinks to the proportional
distribution. Moreover, we state a technical property concerning the reduced game that
result from moving out an agent. This property will be a cornerstone for proving results
in Section 3.
Secondly, to capture the effects of the external agent, we consider in Section 3 the
model of cooperative games with coalition structures (Davis and Maschler, 1963; Aumann
and Dre`ze, 1974). Since the core of the game associated with coalition structure is quite
often empty, we focus on the concept of bargaining set which is always non-empty (Peleg,
1963). To motivate our analysis, we begin providing an example where the proportional
distribution does not belong to the bargaining set of the game with coalition structure.
This example reveals important differences between the two cooperative models with
and without external opportunities. Moreover, it also prompts to solve some interesting
questions. Firstly, we wonder whether or not the proportional distribution belongs to
the bargaining set with coalition structure (see Theorem 1 and 2). Secondly, we analyse
situations where the bargaining set with coalition structure shrinks to the proportional
distribution.
2 The basic model and the core
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents (players) that are engaged in a joint activity.
We denote by ci > 0 the contribution (capital, labor, effort) of agent i and by c =
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) the vector of contributions. For all S ⊆ N , we denote by c(S) the joint
contribution of a subgroup S of agents, that is c(S) =
∑
i∈S ci. A cooperative game is
a function v that assigns to each subcoalition of agents S ⊆ N the surplus generated
v(S) ∈ R+, where v(∅) = 0. We say that v(S) is the worth of coalition S. Furthermore,
and for this model, we assume increasing returns to scale; that is, for all S, T ⊆ N ,
c(S) ≤ c(T )⇒ v(S)
c(S)
≤ v(T )
c(T )
. (1)
We call a game satisfying (1) a game with increasing returns to scale or IRS game
and we denote it by (N, v, c). We denote the class of all IRS games with player set N by
IRGN . It is easy to see that any game with increasing returns to scale is superadditive,
i.e. v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ), for any S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅.
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A distribution of the worth of the grand coalition is a vector x = (xi)i∈N where xi is
the payoff of agent i such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). In the sequel we denote, for all S ⊆ N ,
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi and xS the restriction of x to the members of S. The core of a cooperative
game v with player set N is defined as
C(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N, and x(N) = v(N)}.
An easy way to prove the non-emptiness of the core of an IRS game is to check that
the proportional distribution, p(v, c) = (pi)i∈N , where pi = ci · v(N)c(N) , is a core element of
the game. The proof is straightforward taking into account (1). On the other hand, the
core of a IRS game shrinks into one single point (the proportional distribution) when-
ever the average return of the grand coalition and all coalitions of n−1 members are equal.
Proposition 1 Let (N, v, c) ∈ IRGN be an increasing returns to scale game. Then
C(N, v) = {p(v, c)} if and only if v(N)
c(N)
=
v(N \ {i})
c(N \ {i}) , for all i ∈ N.
Proof ⇒) Let us suppose on the contrary there exists i∗ ∈ N such that
v(N)
c(N)
>
v(N \ {i∗})
c(N \ {i∗}) ,
and consider the payoff vector x 6= p(v, c) ∈ RN defined as xi∗ = v(N) − v(N \ {i∗})
and xi = ci · v(N\{i∗})c(N\{i∗}) , for all i ∈ N \ {i∗}. We check this vector is in the core of the
game contradicting C(N, v) = {p(v, c)}. To this aim, first notice x(N) = v(N). For any
coalition S ⊆ N \ {i∗}, we have
x(S) = c(S) · v(N \ {i
∗})
c(N \ {i∗}) ≥ c(S) ·
v(S)
c(S)
≥ v(S).
If S ⊆ N and i∗ ∈ S then
x(S) = xi∗ + x(S \ {i∗}) = v(N)− v(N \ {i∗}) + c(S \ {i∗}) · v(N\{i∗})c(N\{i∗})
= v(N)− c(N \ S) · v(N\{i∗})
c(N\{i∗}) ≥ c(N) · v(N)c(N) − c(N \ S) · v(N\{i
∗})
c(N\{i∗})
= c(S) · v(N)
c(N)
+ c(N \ S) · (v(N)
c(N)
− v(N\{i∗})
c(N\{i∗}) ) > c(S) · v(N)c(N) ≥ c(S) · v(S)c(S) = v(S).
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⇐) If x 6= p(v, c) then, by efficiency of x, there exists i ∈ N such that xi > ci · v(N)c(N)
and so x(N \ {i}) < c(N \ {i}) · v(N)
c(N)
= c(N \ {i}) · v(N\{i})
c(N\{i}) = v(N \ {i}) contradicting x
to be a core element of v. 
Notice the condition that guarantees the proportional distribution to be the unique
core element says that no player is essential to obtain the higher average return, v(N)
c(N)
.
Otherwise, players that become essential in this sense may claim for a higher payoff within
the core with respect to the proportional allocation. To be more precise, whenever there
is some player i ∈ N such that v(N)
c(N)
> v(N\{i})
c(N\{i}) , we have just proved in Proposition 1
that the maximum payoff to this player within the core is his marginal contribution,
v(N)− v(N \ {i}) > pi.
To end this section, let us introduce the concept of reduced games and enunciate a
technical property concerning reduce IRS games that will be crucial to prove results in
next section. Let v be a cooperative game defined on the player set N , ∅ 6= T ⊆ N and
x ∈ RN . We define the reduced game1 of v at x on T , rTx (v) as
rTx (v)(∅) := 0,
rTx (v)(S) := max
Q⊆N\T
{v(S ∪Q)− x(Q)}, for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ T.
If the game we reduce is an IRS game, and under some conditions on the allocation x,
the reduced game is also an IRS game. The proof can be found in Izquierdo and Rafels
(2001) – see Proposition 3.1 – for the more general class of average monotonic games .
Proposition 2 Let (N, v, c) ∈ IRGN , x ∈ RN and i ∈ N such that xi ≥ ci · v(N)c(N) . Then,
(N \ {i}, rN\{i}x (v), cN\{i}) is an IRS game.
1This definition coincides with the classical Davis-Maschler reduced game concept (Davis and
Maschler, 1965) except for the worth of the grand coalition T .
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3 External opportunities
Suppose we have an IRS game (N, v, c). In order to consider external opportunities, let
us introduce in the problem an agent 0, an external agent that will serve as a reference
to evaluate the bargaining power of the rest of agents. Let us denote by N0 = N ∪ {0}
the extended set of agents that includes agent 0. This agent might contribute an amount
c0 > 0. From now on, with some abuse of notation, we will denote by c = (c0, c1, . . . , cn)
the extended vector of contributions of agents. Let (N0, v0, c) be the IRS game derived
from this new problem, where v0(S) = v(S), for all S ⊆ N .
As we have mentioned in the Introduction, to analyse the new situation we use the
model of cooperative games with coalition structures (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974). A
coalition structure is a partition of the set of agents. To our purpose we will take the
specific partition (or coalition structure) of N0 consisting of the set N and the singleton
{0}. We denote it by β0 = {N, {0}}. An IRS cooperative game with external agent is no
more than an IRS cooperative game with coalition structure β0. Formally,
Definition 1 Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents and N0 = N ∪ {0}. An IRS
game with external agent is a triplet (β0, v0, c) where β0 = {N, {0}}, a vector2 c =
(c0, c1, . . . , cn) ∈ RN0++ and (N0, v0, c) ∈ IRGN0.
The set of imputations (or distributions) of the game (β0, v0, c) is defined as follows:
I(β0, v0) =
{
x ∈ RN0 | x(N) = v0(N), xi ≥ v0({i}), for all i ∈ N, and
x0 = v0({0})
}
.
Notice this model is adequate to analyse the problem with an external agent since an
imputation assigns an efficient distribution to the set of agents N , x(N) = v0(N), being
the payoff to the external player equal to v0({0}). Hence the objective is not to distribute
v(N0) but using agent {0} to distribute v0(N)) among agents in N .
Definition 2 Given an IRS game with external agent, (β0, v0, c), the extended propor-
tional distribution p(β0, v0, c) = (pi)i∈N0 is defined as
2We denote by RN0++ = {x ∈ RN0 | xi > 0 for all i ∈ N0}.
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pi = ci · v(N)
c(N)
, for all i ∈ N and p0 = v0({0}).
Following Aumann and Dre`ze (1974), the core of the IRS game with external agent is
then
C(β0, v0) = {x ∈ I(β0, v0) | x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N0} .
In the definition of the core, let us remark that it is not required x(N0) = v(N0).
However, all core constraints, including those involving players in N cooperating with
player 0, must be satisfied. Quite often, this causes the core to be empty. In fact, the
set-solution concept that fits well to analyse external opportunities is the bargaining set
(Davis and Maschler, 1963) which is based on objections and counter-objections and it is
always a non-empty set.
Let (β0, v0, c) be an IRS game with external agent and x ∈ I(β0, v0). Following Davis
and Maschler, an objection at x of a player i ∈ N against a player j ∈ N , with i 6= j, is a
pair (S, y) where S ⊆ N0, i ∈ S, j 6∈ S and yk > xk, for all k ∈ S, with y(S) = v(S).
A counter-objection to the objection (S, y) is a pair (T, z) where T ⊆ N0, j ∈ T , i 6∈ T
and zk ≥ yk, for all k ∈ T ∩ S, zk ≥ xk, for all k ∈ T \ S with z(T ) = v(T ).
Let us remark that objections and counter-objections can only be raised by players in
N . The external agent 0 can take part of these actions but cannot address or receive them.
The bargaining set of an IRS game with external agent is defined as:
Mi1(β0, v0) = {x ∈ I(β0, v0) | every objection at x has a counter-objection}.
As we have said, the proportional distribution is always a core element (and so it
belongs to the bargaining set) when we deal with the basic model without external oppor-
tunities. Let us see that this cannot be the case in the model with external opportunities.
Example 1 Following the example given in the introduction we have that c = (c0, c1, c2, c3) =
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(200, 100, 100, 300) and the worth of the different coalitions are
v0({0}) = 40, v0({1}) = v0({2}) = 20, v0({3}) = 60,
v0({0, 1}) = v0({0, 2}) = 60, v0({0, 3}) = 150,
v0({1, 2}) = 40, v0({1, 3}) = v0({2, 3}) = 80,
v0({0, 1, 2}) = 80, v0({0, 1, 3}) = v0({0, 2, 3}) = 180, v0({1, 2, 3}) = 150, v(N0) = 210,
where v0(S) = c(S) · r(c(S)), for all S ⊆ N0, with r(x) = 20%, if 0 ≤ x < 500 and
r(x) = 30%, if x ≥ 500.
We claim that the proportional distribution p(β0, v0, c) = (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (40, 30, 30, 90)
is not in the bargaining setMi1(β0, v0). To check it notice p0+p3 = 130 < 150 = v({0, 3}).
The objection of player 3 against player 1 at p(β0, v0, c) through coalition S = {0, 3} de-
fined as y0 = 50 and y3 = 100 cannot be countered by player 1. To see it just notice
p(S) > v0(S), for all S ⊆ N0 with 1 ∈ S and 3 6∈ S.
In fact, we claim the unique point in the bargaining set is x = (x0, x1, x2, x3) =
(40, 20, 20, 110) (notice all the surplus goes to player 3!!). It is an element of the bar-
gaining set since x(S) ≥ v0(S), for all S ⊆ N0 with 3 6∈ S (no objection can be addressed
to player 3) and any objection addressed either to player 1 or 2 is countered by the indi-
vidual worth v0({1}) or v0({2}) respectively.
For the uniqueness part, any other payoff vector x′ 6= x satisfies either x′1 > 20 and
x′2 ≥ 20, or x′1 ≥ 20 and x′2 > 20 since x′ ∈ I(β0, v0). Let us analyse the first case x′1 > 20
and x′2 ≥ 20 being the other case analogous. Since x ∈ I(β0, v0), we have x′3 < 110. The
objection (S, y) of player 3 against player 1 at x′ through {0, 3} defined as y0 = 40+ 110−x
′
3
2
and y3 = x
′
3 +
110−x′3
2
, cannot be countered. To check it simply notice x′(S) > v(S), for all
S ⊆ N0 with 1 ∈ S but 3 6∈ S.
A sufficient condition to guarantee that the proportional distribution is in the bar-
gaining set is stated in the next proposition.
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Theorem 1 Let (β0, v0, c) be an IRS game with external agent.
If
v0(N0 \ {k})
c(N0 \ {k}) =
v0(N)
c(N)
, for all k ∈ N, then p(β0, v0, c) ∈Mi1(β0, v0).
Proof Let p(β0, v0, c) = p = (pi)i∈N0 . If v0(S)− p(S) ≤ 0 for all S ⊆ N0, S 6= N0, then it
trivially holds p(β0, v0, c) ∈Mi1(β0, v0), β0) (there are no objections).
Let S ⊆ N0, S 6= N0, such that v0(S) − p(S) > 0. First notice 0 ∈ S, since by
definition p(R) ≥ v0(R), for all R ⊆ N . Now we prove that for any objection at p there
is a counter-objection. For this, consider an arbitrary objection (S, y) at p of a player
i ∈ S \ {0} against a player j ∈ N \ S, that is
yk = ck · v0(N)c(N) + εk = pk + εk for all k ∈ S \ {0},
y0 = v0({0}) + ε0 = p0 + ε0,
where εk > 0, for all k ∈ S, and
∑
k∈S εk = v0(S)− p(S).
Let us see that player j can always built a counter-objection (N0 \ {i}, z) to the
objection (S, y) as follows:
zk := yk for all k ∈ S \ {i},
zk := pk +
∆
|N0\S| for all k ∈ N0 \ S,
where ∆ = c(S)·[v0(N0\{i})
c(N0\{i}) −
v0(S)
c(S)
]+εi. Notice, since εi > 0 and
v0(N0\{i})
c(N0\{i}) =
v0(N0\{j})
c(N0\{j}) ≥
v0(S)
c(S)
, we have ∆ > 0, and so zk > pk, for all k ∈ N0 \ S. Moreover, it is a valid counter-
objection since
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z(N0 \ {i}) = y(S \ {i}) + p(N0 \ S) + ∆
= p(S \ {i}) +∑k∈S\{i} εk + p(N0 \ S) + c(S) · [v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i}) − v0(S)c(S) ] + εi
= p(S \ {i}) +∑k∈S εk + p(N0 \ S) + c(S) · v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i}) − c(S) · v0(S)c(S)
= p(N0 \ {i}) + v0(S)− p(S) + c(S) · v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i}) − v0(S)
= p(N0 \ {0, i})− p(S \ {0}) + c0 · v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i}) + p(S \ {0})
= p(N0 \ {0, i}) + c0 · v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i})
= c(N0 \ {0, i}) · v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i}) + c0 ·
v0(N0\{i})
c(N0\{i})
= c(N0 \ {i}) · v0(N0\{i})c(N0\{i}) = v0(N0 \ {i}).

The sufficient condition of the above theorem might seem a little bit adhoc to guaran-
tee that the proportional distribution belongs to the bargaining set. Nevertheless, next
theorem shows that, under very mild restrictions on the game, very similar relations have
to hold.
Theorem 2 Let (β0, v0, c) be an IRS game with external agent such that
(i) v0({1}) + v0({2}) + . . .+ v0({n}) < v0(N), and
(ii) mini∈N ci ≤ c0.
If p(β0, v0, c) ∈Mi1(β0, v0), then
v0(N0 \ {k})
c(N0 \ {k}) =
v0(N0 \ {k′})
c(N0 \ {k′}) , for all k, k
′ ∈ N.
Proof Let p(β0, v0, c) = p = (pi)i∈N0 . Without lost of generality let us suppose c1 ≤
c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn and so mini∈N ci = c1 ≤ c0. On one hand, this implies that c(N) ≤
C(N0 \ {1}) and, by definition of IRS game, v0(N)c(N) ≤ v0(N\{1})c(N\{1}) . On the other hand, since
v0({1}) + v0({2}) + . . .+ v0({n}) < v0(N), we can easily deduce p1 > v0({1}).
Let us suppose now that p(β0, v0, c) ∈Mi1(β0, v0) but there exists k, k′ ∈ N such that
v0(N0\{k})
c(N0\{k}) >
v0(N0\{k′})
c(N0\{k′}) . Hence,
v0(N0 \ {1})
c(N0 \ {1}) >
v0(N0 \ {n})
c(N0 \ {n}) . (2)
11
With this assumption, we can define an objection at p(β0, v0, c) without counter-
objection which contradicts the fact that the proportional distribution is in the bargaining
set Mi1(β0, v0).
The objection (N0 \ {1}, y) at p(β0, v0, c) of player n against player 1 is defined as
follows:
yk = ck · v0(N)c(N) + εn−1 for all k ∈ N0 \ {0, 1},
y0 = v0(N0 \ {1})− c(N0 \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)c(N) − ε
where 0 < ε < c0 · [v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) ].
This is a valid objection since y(N0 \ {1}) = v0(N0 \ {1}), yk >= ck · v0(N)c(N) = pk for all
k ∈ N0 \ {0, 1} and
y0 = v0(N0 \ {1})− c(N0 \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)c(N) − ε
> c(N0 \ {1}) · v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) − c(N0 \ {0, 1}) ·
v0(N)
c(N)
− c0 · [v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) ]
≥ c(N \ {1}) · [v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N)
c(N)
] + c0 · v0(N0\{n})c(N0\{n})
> c0 · v0(N0\{n})c(N0\{n}) ≥ c0 ·
v0({0})
c0
= v({0}) = p0
Let us see there is no counter-objection to the above objection. Consider an eventual
counter-objection (T, z) of player 1 against player n. First notice T 6= {1} since p1 >
v0({1}). Furthermore we claim 0 ∈ T ; in other case, T ⊆ N , |T | ≥ 2 and we have
z(T ) ≥ y(T \ {1}) + x1 = p(T \ {1}) + (|T | − 1) · ε
n− 1 + p1 > p(T ) ≥ v0(T ),
where the last equality follows p(T ) ≥ v0(T ). But z(T ) > v0(T ) is not allowed for a
counter-objection and we conclude 0 ∈ T . However, in this case we have,
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z(T ) ≥ y(T \ {1}) + x1 = y(T \ {0, 1}) + y0 + x1
> c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)
c(N)
+ v0(N0 \ {1})− c(N0 \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)c(N)
−c0 · [v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) ] + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
= c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)
c(N)
+ c(N0 \ {0, 1, n}) · v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) + c0 ·
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) + cn ·
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1})
−c(N0 \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)c(N) − c0 · [v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) ] + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
= c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)
c(N)
+ c(N0 \ {0, 1, n}) · v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) + cn ·
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1})
−c(N0 \ {0, 1}) · v0(N)c(N) + c0 · v0(N0\{n})c(N0\{n}) + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
= −c(N0 \ (T ∪ {n})) · v0(N)c(N) − cn · v0(N)c(N) + c(N0 \ {0, 1, n}) · v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) + cn ·
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1})
+c0 · v0(N0\{n})c(N0\{n}) + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
= −c(N0 \ (T ∪ {n})) · v0(N)c(N) − cn · v0(N)c(N) + c(N0 \ (T ∪ {n})) · v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1})
+c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) + cn ·
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) + c0 ·
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
= c(N0 \ (T ∪ {n})) · [v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N)
c(N)
] + c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1})
+cn · [v0(N0\{1})c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N)
c(N)
] + c0 · v0(N0\{n})c(N0\{n}) + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
≥ c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) + c1 · [
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) −
v0(N)
c(N)
] + c0 · v0(N0\{n})c(N0\{n}) + c1 ·
v0(N)
c(N)
= c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) + c1 ·
v0(N0\{1})
c(N0\{1}) + c0 ·
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n})
> c(T \ {0, 1}) · v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) + c1 ·
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) + c0 ·
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n}) = c(T ) ·
v0(N0\{n})
c(N0\{n})
≥ c(T ) · v0(T )
c(T )
and we reach again z(T ) > v0(T ) which invalidates (T, z) as a counter-objection. 
In parallel with the results of the basic model, we state a sufficient condition for the
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proportional distribution to be the unique element of the bargaining set.
Theorem 3 Let (β0, v0, c) be an IRS game with external agent.
If
v0(N \ {k})
c(N \ {k}) =
v0(N0)
c(N0)
, for all k ∈ N, then Mi1(β0, v0) = {p(β0, v0, c)}.
Proof Let p = p(β0, v0, c). Since
v0(N\{k})
c(N\{k}) =
v0(N0)
c(N0)
, for all k ∈ N , and by (1) we also
got v0(N0\{k})
c(N0\{k}) =
v0(N0)
c(N0)
, for all k ∈ N . By Theorem 1, p ∈ Mi1(β0, v0). To prove that
Mi1(β0, v0) ⊆ {p}, let us suppose x 6= p and x ∈ Mi1(β0, v0). By Proposition 1, since
xN 6= pN and v0(N\{k})c(N\{k}) = v0(N)c(N) for all k ∈ N , we have
there exists S ⊆ N such that v0(S)− x(S) > 0. (3)
Moreover, since xN 6= pN , there exists k∗ ∈ N such that xk∗ > ck∗ · v0(N)c(N) and so
x(N \ {k∗}) < c(N \ {k∗}) · v0(N)
c(N)
= c(N \ {k∗}) · v0(N \ {k
∗})
c(N \ {k∗}) = v0(N \ {k
∗}).
Hence,
v0(N0)− x(N0) = c(N0) · v0(N0)c(N0) − v0(N)− x0
= c0 · v0(N0)c(N0) + c(N) ·
v0(N0)
c(N0)
− c(N) · v0(N)
c(N)
− x0
= c0 · v0(N0)c(N0) − x0 < c0 ·
v0(N0)
c(N0)
+ v0(N \ {k∗})− x(N \ {k∗})− x0
≤ v0(N0 \ {k∗})− x(N0 \ {k∗}).
(4)
Now we define the set A as follows:
A = {∅ 6= T ⊆ N0 | (T, rTx (v0), cT ) ∈ IRGT and x(Q) ≥ v(Q) for all Q ⊆ N0 \ T}.
Note that, by Proposition 2 and since xk∗ > ck∗ · v0(N)c(N) = ck∗ · v0(N0)c(N0) , we have N0\{k∗} ∈
A. Let S∗ ∈ A be a minimal coalition with respect to the inclusion. By the above
argument S∗ 6= N0. Moreover, by definition, rS∗x (v0)(S∗) = v0(S∗ ∪Q∗)− x(Q∗), for some
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Q∗ ⊆ N0 \ S∗. If there is more than one of such coalition Q∗ that fits in the definition,
we take Q∗ maximal with respect to the inclusion, that is, if Q∗  Q ⊆ N \ S∗ then
v0(S
∗ ∪Q∗)− x(Q∗) > v0(S∗ ∪Q)− x(Q).
By definition of the set A we have:
(a) For all i ∈ S∗,
xi < ci · r
S∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗)
. (5)
In other case, there would be i ∈ S∗ such that xi ≥ ci · rS
∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗) . If S
∗ = {i∗}, since
S∗ ∈ A, then x(S) ≥ v0(S) for all S ⊆ N0 \ {i∗} and
xi∗ ≥ ci∗ · r
S∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗)
= ci∗ · r
S∗
x (v0)({i∗})
c({i∗}) = r
S∗
x (v0)({i∗}) ≥ v0({i∗} ∪Q)− x(Q),
and so x({i∗}∪Q) ≥ v0({i∗}∪Q), for all Q ⊆ N0 \ {i∗}. Thus x(S) ≥ v0(S), for all
S ⊆ N0, contradicting ( 3 ).
If |S∗| > 1 and there exist i ∈ S∗ such that xi ≥ ci · rS
∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗) , by the same
reasoning as before, we have x({i∗} ∪ Q) ≥ v0({i∗} ∪ Q), for all Q ⊆ N0 \ S∗. But
this means that, by Proposition 2, coalition S∗ \ {i∗} would be in A contradicting3
the minimality of S∗.
(b) We claim S∗ 6= {0}. On the contrary, let us suppose S∗ = {0}. Since S∗ ∈ A, we
have x(S) ≥ v0(S), for all S ⊆ N , which involves a contradiction with (3).
(c) If S∗ = {i} then Q∗ 6= ∅ (or |S∗ ∪Q∗| > 1). Otherwise, if Q∗ = ∅ and by (5),
xi < ci · r
{i}
x (v0)({i})
c({i}) = ci ·
v0({i})
c({i}) = v0({i}),
but this contradicts x to be an imputation of the game (β0, v0).
(d) S∗ ∪Q∗ 6= N since, by (a), x(S∗) < rS∗x (v0)(S∗) = v0(S∗ ∪Q∗)− x(Q∗) and thus, if
S∗ ∪Q∗ = N , we would have x(N) < v0(N) contradicting that x ∈ I(β0, v0).
3The reduction process is transitive; see Lemma 3.1 in Izquierdo and Rafels (2001).
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Let i∗ ∈ S∗, i∗ 6= 0 and j∗ ∈ N\(S∗∪Q∗) where the last player exists since S∗∪Q∗ 6= N .
Then, we define the objection (S∗ ∪Q∗, y) at x of player i∗ against player j∗ as follows:
yi∗ = ci∗ · rS
∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗) − ε
yk = ck · rS
∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗) +
ε
|S∗∪Q∗|−1 for all k ∈ S∗ \ {i∗}
yk = xk +
ε
|S∗∪Q∗|−1 for all k ∈ Q∗,
where 0 < ε < ci∗ · rS
∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗) − xi∗ .
Now consider an eventual counterobjection (T, z) of player j∗ against player i∗. By
definition, it is necessary v0(T )−x(T ) ≥ 0. On the other hand, we claim T∩(S∗∪Q∗) 6= ∅.
In other case, T ∩ (S∗ ∪ Q∗) = ∅, and by the superadditivity of the game (N0, v0), we
have
v0(S
∗∪Q∗)−x(Q∗) ≤ v0(S∗∪Q∗)−x(Q∗) + v0(T )−x(T ) ≤ v0(S∗∪Q∗∪T )−x(Q∗∪T ),
but this contradicts the maximality of Q∗. Hence, if T ∩ S∗ 6= ∅
z(T ) ≥ y(T ∩ (S∗ ∪Q∗)) + x(T \ (S∗ ∪Q∗))
= y(T ∩ S∗) + y(T ∩Q∗) + x(T \ (S∗ ∪Q∗))
> c(T ∩ S∗) · rS
∗
x (v0)(S
∗)
c(S∗) + x(T ∩Q∗) + x(T \ (S∗ ∪Q∗))
≥ c(T ∩ S∗) · rS
∗
x (v0)(T∩S∗)
c(T∩S∗) + x(T ∩Q∗) + x(T \ (S∗ ∪Q∗))
= rS
∗
x (v0)(T ∩ S∗) + x(T ∩Q∗) + x(T \ (S∗ ∪Q∗))
≥ v0((T ∩ S∗) ∪ (T \ S∗))− x(T \ S∗) + x(T ∩Q∗) + x(T \ (S∗ ∪Q∗)) = v0(T )
Thus, we get z(T ) > v0(T ) which it is not allowed for a counter-objection.
In case T ∩ S∗ = ∅, then we have T ⊆ N0 \ S∗ and we obtain z(T ) > x(T ). However,
since S∗ ∈ A and T ⊆ N0 \ S∗, we also know x(T ) ≥ v0(T ). Thus, z(T ) > v0(T ) and we
reach the same contradiction.

16
References
[1] Auman RJ, Dre`ze JH (1974). Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures. Int. J.
Game Theory 3, 217–237
[2] Davis M, Maschler M (1963). Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooper-
ative Games. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 69, 106–108
[3] Davis M, Maschler M (1965). The Kernel of a Cooperative Game. Naval Res. Logist.
Quart. 12, 223–259
[4] Davis M, Maschler M (1967). Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooper-
ative Games, in Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgestern,
39–52. (M. Shubik, Ed.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton Iniv. Press.
[5] Izquierdo JM, Rafels C (2001). Average Monotonic Cooperative Games. Games Econ.
Behav. 36, 174–192
[6] Lemaire J (1991). Cooperative Game Theory and its Insurance Applications. Astin
Bull. 21, 17–40
[7] Mas-Colell A (1980). Remarks on the Game-theoretic Analysis of a Simple Distribu-
tion of Surplus Problem. Int. J. Game Theory 9(3), 125–140
[8] Peleg, B (1963). Existence Theorem for the Bargaining SetM(i)1 . Bull. Amer. Math.
Soc. 69, 109–110
17
